Peer-Reviewed Publications
Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws, Forthcoming (July 2020) at University of Michigan Press
There is broad consensus among voters, political scientists, and members of Congress that Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of legislating, lawmakers devote themselves to partisan grandstanding, in which their only goal is to score political points at the expense of the opposition. Yet, this persistent focus on partisan fighting obfuscates a more complicated reality on Capitol Hill. Sometimes Congress is dysfunctional, but sometimes Congress is productive. Indeed, within a congressional term, there is substantial variation in Democrats and Republicans’ willingness to enact laws or play politics.
Losing to Win addresses two questions, namely: When and why do parties in Congress choose to make laws or propagate legislative dysfunction? And why do some issues become so politicized they are only used to score political points, while others remain safe for compromise? To study this trade-off between legislating and bickering, I develop a novel theory of agenda-setting in which majority parties in Congress auction scarce plenary time to their allied interest groups. Using a new dataset that identifies dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the legislation lawmakers know will fail, I examine when majorities prefer to advance DOA legislation instead of other bills and the political consequences of advancing these extreme proposals.
My core conclusion is that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of working to enact legislation, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. In particular, majority parties emphasize dead-on-arrival bills when control for government is competitive. When the majority believes it can win unified government, it is more likely to advance DOA bills as a way to accrue additional political support from allied interest groups. Organized interests reliably reward the majority party for advancing DOA legislation in order to help their allies win more power in government and get legislators to adopt the extreme issue as the party’s working alternative.
Consequently, I demonstrate that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to get their preferred policies enacted. This project moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization and closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. In doing so, I provide a new perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Gelman, Jeremy. 2019. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics 25(6): 782-793.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
There is broad consensus among voters, political scientists, and members of Congress that Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of legislating, lawmakers devote themselves to partisan grandstanding, in which their only goal is to score political points at the expense of the opposition. Yet, this persistent focus on partisan fighting obfuscates a more complicated reality on Capitol Hill. Sometimes Congress is dysfunctional, but sometimes Congress is productive. Indeed, within a congressional term, there is substantial variation in Democrats and Republicans’ willingness to enact laws or play politics.
Losing to Win addresses two questions, namely: When and why do parties in Congress choose to make laws or propagate legislative dysfunction? And why do some issues become so politicized they are only used to score political points, while others remain safe for compromise? To study this trade-off between legislating and bickering, I develop a novel theory of agenda-setting in which majority parties in Congress auction scarce plenary time to their allied interest groups. Using a new dataset that identifies dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the legislation lawmakers know will fail, I examine when majorities prefer to advance DOA legislation instead of other bills and the political consequences of advancing these extreme proposals.
My core conclusion is that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of working to enact legislation, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. In particular, majority parties emphasize dead-on-arrival bills when control for government is competitive. When the majority believes it can win unified government, it is more likely to advance DOA bills as a way to accrue additional political support from allied interest groups. Organized interests reliably reward the majority party for advancing DOA legislation in order to help their allies win more power in government and get legislators to adopt the extreme issue as the party’s working alternative.
Consequently, I demonstrate that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to get their preferred policies enacted. This project moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization and closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. In doing so, I provide a new perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Gelman, Jeremy. 2019. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics 25(6): 782-793.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Working Papers
Ask and You May Receive: Senators’ Strategies for Securing Distributive Benefits” - Revise and Resubmit at Congress & the Presidency
“Partisan Intensity in Congress: Evidence from Brett Kavanaugh’s Nomination” - Revise and Resubmit at Political Research Quarterly
“Mixing Messages: How Candidates Vary in Their Use of Twitter” - with Steven Wilson and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca - Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Information Technology & Politics
“Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences” - with Steven Wilson
“Partisan Intensity in Congress: Evidence from Brett Kavanaugh’s Nomination” - Revise and Resubmit at Political Research Quarterly
“Mixing Messages: How Candidates Vary in Their Use of Twitter” - with Steven Wilson and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca - Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Information Technology & Politics
“Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences” - with Steven Wilson