Peer-Reviewed Publications
Books:
Why Partisanship? The Roots of the Hyper-Partisan Congress (with Steven Lloyd Wilson - in preparation)
One of the most striking features of the US Congress is its hyper-partisanship. Lawmakers regularly choose to bicker for political gain, whether or not they disagree on issues. The hyper-partisan rhythms of Congress are familiar – members attacking each other, blaming the other side for any bad outcome and cheerleading their side’s accomplishments, and one political party choosing to oppose the other’s ideas to deny it political wins. Partisanship’s consequences are serious and well-known. In particular, members of Congress help politicize issues that polarize citizens’ attitudes and prevent policy compromises. For instance, previously non-political issues, like many of the health measures associated with COVID-19 or presidents’ releasing their tax returns, quickly politicize with each party becoming associated with one side of the issue.
Why Partisanship? addresses why members of Congress choose to act as partisans and what consequences they experience because of their behavior. We develop a novel theory of why some legislators are more eager to frame issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans than others. We argue that partisanship helps fulfill two of their political goals. Yes, it helps them win reelection, the standard argument. But lawmakers also use partisanship to become politically influential. When they want a promotion, by becoming a congressional party or committee leader or running for higher office, they act as partisans to show they are good, reliable team players. This signals their co-partisans in Congress and the extended party network that funds expensive campaigns that they can be trusted in their new, more prominent role.
Our core conclusions are that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators, it is motivated by reelection and promotion-seeking considerations, and comes with no substantial legislative or electoral consequences. Some legislators devote significant time and energy to supporting their party or bickering with the opposition. Others almost none. These more partisan members are motivated both by reelection and promotion-seeking concerns. For instance, those representing safer districts display more partisan behavior as do those holding or seeking leadership positions in the House and Senate.
Through our analysis, we systematically track and provide a new explanation for one of the omnipresent but least understood concepts in congressional politics: legislators’ individual partisan behavior. We move beyond conventional arguments and measures, that partisanship is just about voting together and appealing to voters, and closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas. The result is a new explanation for why Congress is hyper-partisan with clear, evidence-based recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.
Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws
[University of Michigan Press] [Amazon]
There is broad consensus among voters, political scientists, and members of Congress that Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of legislating, lawmakers devote themselves to partisan grandstanding, in which their only goal is to score political points at the expense of the opposition. Yet, this persistent focus on partisan fighting obfuscates a more complicated reality on Capitol Hill. Sometimes Congress is dysfunctional, but sometimes Congress is productive. Indeed, within a congressional term, there is substantial variation in Democrats and Republicans’ willingness to enact laws or play politics.
Losing to Win addresses two questions, namely: When and why do parties in Congress choose to make laws or propagate legislative dysfunction? And why do some issues become so politicized they are only used to score political points, while others remain safe for compromise? To study this trade-off between legislating and bickering, I develop a novel theory of agenda-setting in which majority parties in Congress auction scarce plenary time to their allied interest groups. Using a new dataset that identifies dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the legislation lawmakers know will fail, I examine when majorities prefer to advance DOA legislation instead of other bills and the political consequences of advancing these extreme proposals.
My core conclusion is that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of working to enact legislation, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. In particular, majority parties emphasize dead-on-arrival bills when control for government is competitive. When the majority believes it can win unified government, it is more likely to advance DOA bills as a way to accrue additional political support from allied interest groups. Organized interests reliably reward the majority party for advancing DOA legislation in order to help their allies win more power in government and get legislators to adopt the extreme issue as the party’s working alternative.
Consequently, I demonstrate that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to get their preferred policies enacted. This project moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization and closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. In doing so, I provide a new perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Journal Articles:
Gelman, Jeremy and Steven Lloyd Wilson. 2022. "Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences. Legislative Studies Quarterly 47(1): 225-256.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. "Ask and You May Receive: Senators’ Strategies for Securing Distributive Benefits.” Congress & the Presidency 48(2): 123-146.
Gelman, Jeremy, Steven Lloyd Wilson, and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca. 2021. “Mixing Messages: How Candidates Vary in Their Use of Twitter.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 18(1): 101-115.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. “Partisan Intensity in Congress: Evidence from Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court Nomination.” Political Research Quarterly 74(2): 450-463.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2019. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics 25(6): 782-793.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Why Partisanship? The Roots of the Hyper-Partisan Congress (with Steven Lloyd Wilson - in preparation)
One of the most striking features of the US Congress is its hyper-partisanship. Lawmakers regularly choose to bicker for political gain, whether or not they disagree on issues. The hyper-partisan rhythms of Congress are familiar – members attacking each other, blaming the other side for any bad outcome and cheerleading their side’s accomplishments, and one political party choosing to oppose the other’s ideas to deny it political wins. Partisanship’s consequences are serious and well-known. In particular, members of Congress help politicize issues that polarize citizens’ attitudes and prevent policy compromises. For instance, previously non-political issues, like many of the health measures associated with COVID-19 or presidents’ releasing their tax returns, quickly politicize with each party becoming associated with one side of the issue.
Why Partisanship? addresses why members of Congress choose to act as partisans and what consequences they experience because of their behavior. We develop a novel theory of why some legislators are more eager to frame issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans than others. We argue that partisanship helps fulfill two of their political goals. Yes, it helps them win reelection, the standard argument. But lawmakers also use partisanship to become politically influential. When they want a promotion, by becoming a congressional party or committee leader or running for higher office, they act as partisans to show they are good, reliable team players. This signals their co-partisans in Congress and the extended party network that funds expensive campaigns that they can be trusted in their new, more prominent role.
Our core conclusions are that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators, it is motivated by reelection and promotion-seeking considerations, and comes with no substantial legislative or electoral consequences. Some legislators devote significant time and energy to supporting their party or bickering with the opposition. Others almost none. These more partisan members are motivated both by reelection and promotion-seeking concerns. For instance, those representing safer districts display more partisan behavior as do those holding or seeking leadership positions in the House and Senate.
Through our analysis, we systematically track and provide a new explanation for one of the omnipresent but least understood concepts in congressional politics: legislators’ individual partisan behavior. We move beyond conventional arguments and measures, that partisanship is just about voting together and appealing to voters, and closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas. The result is a new explanation for why Congress is hyper-partisan with clear, evidence-based recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.
Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws
[University of Michigan Press] [Amazon]
There is broad consensus among voters, political scientists, and members of Congress that Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of legislating, lawmakers devote themselves to partisan grandstanding, in which their only goal is to score political points at the expense of the opposition. Yet, this persistent focus on partisan fighting obfuscates a more complicated reality on Capitol Hill. Sometimes Congress is dysfunctional, but sometimes Congress is productive. Indeed, within a congressional term, there is substantial variation in Democrats and Republicans’ willingness to enact laws or play politics.
Losing to Win addresses two questions, namely: When and why do parties in Congress choose to make laws or propagate legislative dysfunction? And why do some issues become so politicized they are only used to score political points, while others remain safe for compromise? To study this trade-off between legislating and bickering, I develop a novel theory of agenda-setting in which majority parties in Congress auction scarce plenary time to their allied interest groups. Using a new dataset that identifies dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the legislation lawmakers know will fail, I examine when majorities prefer to advance DOA legislation instead of other bills and the political consequences of advancing these extreme proposals.
My core conclusion is that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of working to enact legislation, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. In particular, majority parties emphasize dead-on-arrival bills when control for government is competitive. When the majority believes it can win unified government, it is more likely to advance DOA bills as a way to accrue additional political support from allied interest groups. Organized interests reliably reward the majority party for advancing DOA legislation in order to help their allies win more power in government and get legislators to adopt the extreme issue as the party’s working alternative.
Consequently, I demonstrate that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to get their preferred policies enacted. This project moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization and closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. In doing so, I provide a new perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Journal Articles:
Gelman, Jeremy and Steven Lloyd Wilson. 2022. "Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences. Legislative Studies Quarterly 47(1): 225-256.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. "Ask and You May Receive: Senators’ Strategies for Securing Distributive Benefits.” Congress & the Presidency 48(2): 123-146.
Gelman, Jeremy, Steven Lloyd Wilson, and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca. 2021. “Mixing Messages: How Candidates Vary in Their Use of Twitter.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 18(1): 101-115.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. “Partisan Intensity in Congress: Evidence from Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court Nomination.” Political Research Quarterly 74(2): 450-463.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2019. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics 25(6): 782-793.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Working Papers
The Deaths of Ideas in Congress
Policy Windows Revisited: The Origins of Ideas in Congress
Policy Windows Revisited: The Origins of Ideas in Congress