Congress
Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws - Book Manuscript
There is broad consensus among voters, political scientists, and members of Congress that Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of legislating, lawmakers devote themselves to partisan grandstanding, in which their only goal is to score political points at the expense of the opposition. Yet, this persistent focus on partisan fighting obfuscates a more complicated reality on Capitol Hill. Sometimes Congress is dysfunctional, but sometimes Congress is productive. Indeed, within a congressional term, there is substantial variation in Democrats and Republicans’ willingness to enact laws or play politics.
Losing to Win addresses two questions, namely: When and why do parties in Congress choose to make laws or propagate legislative dysfunction? And why do some issues become so politicized they are only used to score political points, while others remain safe for compromise? To study this trade-off between legislating and bickering, I develop a novel theory of agenda-setting in which majority parties in Congress auction scarce plenary time to their allied interest groups. Using a new dataset that identifies dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the legislation lawmakers know will fail, I examine when majorities prefer to advance DOA legislation instead of other bills and the political consequences of advancing these extreme proposals.
My core conclusion is that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of working to enact legislation, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. In particular, majority parties emphasize dead-on-arrival bills when control for government is competitive. When the majority believes it can win unified government, it is more likely to advance DOA bills as a way to accrue additional political support from allied interest groups. Organized interests reliably reward the majority party for advancing DOA legislation in order to help their allies win more power in government and get legislators to adopt the extreme issue as the party’s working alternative.
Consequently, I demonstrate that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to get their preferred policies enacted. This project moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization and closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. In doing so, I provide a new perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship
During the 20th century, Congress experienced two main shifts in partisan conflict. Early decades were marked by a substantial decrease in party divisiveness, reaching a nadir by mid-century. Beginning in the 1970s, partisanship has increased to the point that Congress is now viewed as "hyper-partisan." Political scientists have thoroughly examined this more recent shift; however, few studies consider why party divisiveness has fluctuated during the past century and over time more generally. Lee's (2016) recent work contends a main factor that drives legislative partisanship is the majority party's prospects for retaining control of its chamber. Using data on every Senate roll call vote since 1915 and a novel measure of party competition, I examine whether partisan voting is associated with insecure majority status. My results support this theory as I find that voting coalitions in the Senate become more partisan as the majority's probability of remaining in power decreases.
Gelman, Jeremy. Forthcoming. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics.
Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure
Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead-on-arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority-party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
There is broad consensus among voters, political scientists, and members of Congress that Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of legislating, lawmakers devote themselves to partisan grandstanding, in which their only goal is to score political points at the expense of the opposition. Yet, this persistent focus on partisan fighting obfuscates a more complicated reality on Capitol Hill. Sometimes Congress is dysfunctional, but sometimes Congress is productive. Indeed, within a congressional term, there is substantial variation in Democrats and Republicans’ willingness to enact laws or play politics.
Losing to Win addresses two questions, namely: When and why do parties in Congress choose to make laws or propagate legislative dysfunction? And why do some issues become so politicized they are only used to score political points, while others remain safe for compromise? To study this trade-off between legislating and bickering, I develop a novel theory of agenda-setting in which majority parties in Congress auction scarce plenary time to their allied interest groups. Using a new dataset that identifies dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the legislation lawmakers know will fail, I examine when majorities prefer to advance DOA legislation instead of other bills and the political consequences of advancing these extreme proposals.
My core conclusion is that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of working to enact legislation, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. In particular, majority parties emphasize dead-on-arrival bills when control for government is competitive. When the majority believes it can win unified government, it is more likely to advance DOA bills as a way to accrue additional political support from allied interest groups. Organized interests reliably reward the majority party for advancing DOA legislation in order to help their allies win more power in government and get legislators to adopt the extreme issue as the party’s working alternative.
Consequently, I demonstrate that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to get their preferred policies enacted. This project moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization and closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. In doing so, I provide a new perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship
During the 20th century, Congress experienced two main shifts in partisan conflict. Early decades were marked by a substantial decrease in party divisiveness, reaching a nadir by mid-century. Beginning in the 1970s, partisanship has increased to the point that Congress is now viewed as "hyper-partisan." Political scientists have thoroughly examined this more recent shift; however, few studies consider why party divisiveness has fluctuated during the past century and over time more generally. Lee's (2016) recent work contends a main factor that drives legislative partisanship is the majority party's prospects for retaining control of its chamber. Using data on every Senate roll call vote since 1915 and a novel measure of party competition, I examine whether partisan voting is associated with insecure majority status. My results support this theory as I find that voting coalitions in the Senate become more partisan as the majority's probability of remaining in power decreases.
Gelman, Jeremy. Forthcoming. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics.
Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure
Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead-on-arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority-party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
The Presidency
The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs (with Gilad Wilkenfeld and E. Scott Adler)
The president is commonly viewed as a crucial actor in setting the legislative policy agenda. We consider what factors lead the president to include some issues in his agenda and not others. We find the White House focuses on policy areas in which Congress is likely to legislate anyway. Specifically, more policy proposals are sent on topics in which there are more expiring laws that require renewal and that are salient to the public.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Money Follows the Winner: Evidence from Business Interests' Contributions During the 2008 Presidential General Election (with Paul Zachary)
In this project, we consider the strategic nature of business interest contributions, and what this behavior implies about how industries seek influence with officials. Using data from contributions during presidential general elections, we show business interests increase their donations to the candidate whose probability of winning is increasing. Rather than only backing a certain candidate, we find industries seek a measure of influence regardless of the partisanship or policy preferences of each candidate.
The president is commonly viewed as a crucial actor in setting the legislative policy agenda. We consider what factors lead the president to include some issues in his agenda and not others. We find the White House focuses on policy areas in which Congress is likely to legislate anyway. Specifically, more policy proposals are sent on topics in which there are more expiring laws that require renewal and that are salient to the public.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Money Follows the Winner: Evidence from Business Interests' Contributions During the 2008 Presidential General Election (with Paul Zachary)
In this project, we consider the strategic nature of business interest contributions, and what this behavior implies about how industries seek influence with officials. Using data from contributions during presidential general elections, we show business interests increase their donations to the candidate whose probability of winning is increasing. Rather than only backing a certain candidate, we find industries seek a measure of influence regardless of the partisanship or policy preferences of each candidate.