Peer-Reviewed Publications
Books:
Posting for Power: Congressional Partisanship on Social Media [Spring 2026, University of Michigan Press]
Among the most common features of the modern US Congress is its partisanship, a deeply felt political divide that sometimes seems to be each side’s primary motivator. In Congress, we have seen heated disagreements, a tendency to blame the opposing party for any bad outcome, and attempts to undermine the other side’s successes. For those watching Congress, it is easy to assume everyone on Capitol Hill participates equally in framing issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans.
Yet in Posting for Power, Jeremy Gelman and Steven Wilson show that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators. By analyzing millions of social media posts, Gelman and Wilson quantify a legislator’s partisan intensity through the time and effort they spend supporting their party and bickering with the opposition. Bringing together a wide range of data on leadership races, elections, voting records, cosponsorship patterns, and lawmaking outcomes, they demonstrate the nearly consequence-free way that legislators strategically deploy partisanship to impress their copartisans and voters. Gelman and Wilson closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas and offer clear recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.
Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws
[University of Michigan Press] [Amazon]
Most everyone, voters, political scientists, even lawmakers, think Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of solving problems, Democrats and Republicans spend their time playing politics. These days Capitol Hill seems more a place to bicker, not to pass laws. The reality is more complicated. Yes, sometimes Congress is broken. But sometimes it is productive. What explains this variation? Why do Democrats and Republicans choose to legislate or score political points? And why do some issues become so politicized they devolve into partisan warfare, while others remain safe for compromise?
Losing to Win answers these questions through a novel theory of agenda-setting. Unlike other research that studies bills that become law, Jeremy Gelman begins from the opposite perspective. He studies why majority parties knowingly take up dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the ideas everyone knows are going to lose. In doing so, he argues that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of compromising, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. Gelman finds that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to enact their policies. He also challenges the conventional wisdom that DOA legislation is political theater. By tracking bills over time, Gelman shows that some former dead-on-arrival ideas eventually become law. In this way, ideas viewed as too extreme or partisan today can produce long-lasting future policy changes.
Through his analysis, Gelman provides an original explanation for why both parties pursue the partisan bickering that voters find so frustrating. He moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization. Instead, he closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. The result is a fresh, straightforward perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Journal Articles:
Gelman, Jeremy. 2024. "The Deaths of Ideas in Congress." Political Research Quarterly 77(3): 772-786.
Gelman, Jeremy and Steven Lloyd Wilson. 2022. "Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences". Legislative Studies Quarterly 47(1): 225-256.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. "Ask and You May Receive: Senators’ Strategies for Securing Distributive Benefits.” Congress & the Presidency 48(2): 123-146.
Gelman, Jeremy, Steven Lloyd Wilson, and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca. 2021. “Mixing Messages: How Candidates Vary in Their Use of Twitter.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 18(1): 101-115.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. “Partisan Intensity in Congress: Evidence from Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court Nomination.” Political Research Quarterly 74(2): 450-463.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2019. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics 25(6): 782-793.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Posting for Power: Congressional Partisanship on Social Media [Spring 2026, University of Michigan Press]
Among the most common features of the modern US Congress is its partisanship, a deeply felt political divide that sometimes seems to be each side’s primary motivator. In Congress, we have seen heated disagreements, a tendency to blame the opposing party for any bad outcome, and attempts to undermine the other side’s successes. For those watching Congress, it is easy to assume everyone on Capitol Hill participates equally in framing issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans.
Yet in Posting for Power, Jeremy Gelman and Steven Wilson show that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators. By analyzing millions of social media posts, Gelman and Wilson quantify a legislator’s partisan intensity through the time and effort they spend supporting their party and bickering with the opposition. Bringing together a wide range of data on leadership races, elections, voting records, cosponsorship patterns, and lawmaking outcomes, they demonstrate the nearly consequence-free way that legislators strategically deploy partisanship to impress their copartisans and voters. Gelman and Wilson closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas and offer clear recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.
Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead of Make Laws
[University of Michigan Press] [Amazon]
Most everyone, voters, political scientists, even lawmakers, think Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of solving problems, Democrats and Republicans spend their time playing politics. These days Capitol Hill seems more a place to bicker, not to pass laws. The reality is more complicated. Yes, sometimes Congress is broken. But sometimes it is productive. What explains this variation? Why do Democrats and Republicans choose to legislate or score political points? And why do some issues become so politicized they devolve into partisan warfare, while others remain safe for compromise?
Losing to Win answers these questions through a novel theory of agenda-setting. Unlike other research that studies bills that become law, Jeremy Gelman begins from the opposite perspective. He studies why majority parties knowingly take up dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the ideas everyone knows are going to lose. In doing so, he argues that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of compromising, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. Gelman finds that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to enact their policies. He also challenges the conventional wisdom that DOA legislation is political theater. By tracking bills over time, Gelman shows that some former dead-on-arrival ideas eventually become law. In this way, ideas viewed as too extreme or partisan today can produce long-lasting future policy changes.
Through his analysis, Gelman provides an original explanation for why both parties pursue the partisan bickering that voters find so frustrating. He moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization. Instead, he closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. The result is a fresh, straightforward perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Journal Articles:
Gelman, Jeremy. 2024. "The Deaths of Ideas in Congress." Political Research Quarterly 77(3): 772-786.
Gelman, Jeremy and Steven Lloyd Wilson. 2022. "Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences". Legislative Studies Quarterly 47(1): 225-256.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. "Ask and You May Receive: Senators’ Strategies for Securing Distributive Benefits.” Congress & the Presidency 48(2): 123-146.
Gelman, Jeremy, Steven Lloyd Wilson, and Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca. 2021. “Mixing Messages: How Candidates Vary in Their Use of Twitter.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 18(1): 101-115.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2021. “Partisan Intensity in Congress: Evidence from Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court Nomination.” Political Research Quarterly 74(2): 450-463.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2019. "In Pursuit of Power: Competition for Majority Status and Senate Partisanship." Party Politics 25(6): 782-793.
Gelman, Jeremy. 2017. "Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4): 661-692.
Gelman, Jeremy, Gilad Wilkenfeld, and E. Scott Adler. 2015. "The Opportunistic President: How U.S. Presidents Determine Their Legislative Programs." Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 363-390.
Working Papers
The (Sometimes Untraceable) Origins of Policy Ideas in Congress: An Analysis of Seven Landmark Laws